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CONTORTS: PATROLLING THE BORDERLAND OF CONTRACT
AND TORT IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
The merger of traditional rules of tort and contract is a phenomenon well
recognized by legal scholars.' Yet in the legal malpractice area, where actions
frequently lie in what has been called the "borderland of tort and contract," 2
courts often have disagreed on the underlying theory of the action. Some courts
view it as a contract action that arises from the attorney's breach of an implied
promise to use a reasonable degree of skill and care in the exercise of his profes-
sional duties. 3 Other courts, however, view it as a tort action that results from
the attorney's breach of duty to use due care — a duty, created by the attorney-
client relationship.* Although their situations may be similar, different plaintiffs
may be precluded from bringing an action, or denied full relief, because of their
decision to bring the suit in one form or the other.
Of particular importance to a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action are dif-
ferent rules of tort and contract regarding the length of the statute of
limitations; 3 accrual of the cause of action for statute of limitation purposes; 6
survivability of the action;' and types of damages recoverable. 6 Distinctions
between the rules of tort and contract often are based on anachronistic principles
of law. Hence, courts 
at	
with the prospect of denying a worthy plaintiff
appropriate relief, or t least a trial on the merits, have often resorted to
manipulating both facts and doctrine to reach a desired result. This
manipulation seems preferable to the alternative of barring an injured party's
claim, but it is not the most rational or effective means of distributing justice,
because a plaintiff's chance of success depends less on the merits of his claim
than on the resourcefulness of counsel and the willingness of the court to read the
facts and the law in a favorable light. A just resolution of a legal malpractice
claim is better insured by a greater concern for the worthiness of the plaintiff's
claim than for the traditional distinctions between tort and contract.
' G. GILMORE, The Death of Contract (1974) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; Speidel,
An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN, L. REV. 1161 (1975);
Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASBURN L. J. 38 (1977); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 330 (1980).
2 W. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS (1953).
See, e.g., Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 279, 265 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1980); Winslow
Inc. v. Scaife, 219 Va. 997, 1000, 254 S.E.2d 48, 60 (1979). See generally Wade, The Attorney's
Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND L. REV. 755, 756, 756-57 n.11 (1959); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1292-93 (1963).
4 Christison v. Jones, 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 336, 405 N.E.2d 8, 9 (1980); Johnson v. Gold,
71 A.D.2d 1056, 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (1979). See generally Casenote, 63 MINN. L. REV.
751, 752-53 (1979).
3 See text and notes at notes 9-22, 54-65, & 102-12 infra.
6 See text and notes at notes 27-40, 66-81, & 113-22 infra.
7 See text and notes at notes 41-53, 82-99, & 123-34 infra.
a See text and notes at notes 136-203 infra.
545
546	 BOSTON COLLEGE LA W REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:545
This note will analyze the action of legal malpractice as it relates to the
merger of tort and contract. First, the article will examine cases in which strict
adherence to traditional theories has either denied the plaintiff access to the
courts or limited his recovery. The note then will present cases in which the
courts have ignored distinctions between tort and contract to avoid such results.
Next, the reasoning of these cases will be analyzed to determine the correct
approach to the problem. Finally, this note will discuss the problem of damages
and the manner in which distinctions between tort and contract have affected
recoveries in legal malpractice cases. It will be submitted that courts should not
be bound by artificial distinctions between tort and contract in legal malpractice
suits, but instead should look behind form to the gist of the action. The heading
under which the suit is brought should not determine its outcome.
I. THE EFFECT OF TRADITIONAL DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN TORT AND CONTRACT
A. The Statute of Limitations
The decision to bring a legal malpractice action in either tort or contract is
often a crucial one, because the statute of limitations governing a tort action is
usually shorter than the statute governing a contract action.° This difference in
statutory periods becomes significant when the plaintiff is not permitted to elect
between a tort or contract action. In such cases, the court must determine
whether the nature of the action is essentially tort or contract. It is a distinction
not easily made. The legal malpractice action is a two-headed creature, one
head born of the breach of an implied contractual relationship, the other
growing from a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by an attorney to his client.
The ability of counsel to emphasize one aspect of the suit at the expense of the
other plays a major role in the outcome of the case. Differences in the skill of
counsel, as well as in the predelictions of the court, have led to inconsistent
results in this area of the law.'° Decisions regarding which statute of limitations
governs the legal malpractice suit illustrate this phenomenon.
Because the line between tort and contract is so difficult to draw in actions
of attorney malpractice, courts have at times based their decisions on arbitrary,
unconvincing factors. In Nickerson v. Martin," for example, a Connecticut
9 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-576 (1979): "No action on any simple or implied
contract, or upon any contract in writing shall be brought but within six years next after the right
of action accrues." Id. CONN. GEN. STAT. $ 52-577 (1979) provides: "No action founded upon a
tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." Id.
M.A. GLENDON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACT AND
TORT IN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW 4-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GLENDON]. In reference to
cases decided in the borderland of tort and contract, it has been noted:
There is probably no more barren and unrewarding group of decisions to be found in
the law. They turn almost entirely upon the details of language, which of course vary
from case to case. They are in what only can be described as a snarl of utter confusion,
from which no generalization can be derived except that there is total disagreement.
W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 432-34. Nevertheless, distinctions made within this "snarl of utter
confusion" can determine success or failure for a legal malpractice suit.
" 374 A.2d 258 (Cons. Super. 1976).
March 1981]
	
CONTORTS	 547
superior court's unexplained reliance on a tort statute of limitations prevented
the plaintiff from bringing a legal malpractice action. The defendant/client in
Nickerson answered his attorney's action to recover legal fees and expenses with a
counterclaim for malpractice.' 2 The client argued that the attorney was negli-
gent in the preparation of a trust instrument and in the execution of a sale of real
estate owned by the defendant . 13 In deciding that the attorney's action to recover
legal fees was timely, the court applied the contract statute of limitations. 14
Nevertheless, the court maintained, rather cryptically, that legal malpractice
actions were governed by the tort statute of limitations, even though that statute
did not refer specifically to actions against attorneys."' Thus, in Nickerson, the
attorney could bring a timely action in contract for the recovery of the value of
his legal services, but the client, under tort theory, could not counterclaim that
those services were negligently performed."
The question of which statute of limitations to apply proved crucial for the
plaintiff in Box v. Karam" as well. The attorney/defendant in Box rendered a title
opinion on which the plaintiff relied in the purchase of real estate." The attorney
failed to discover, however, that neither the plaintiff's deed nor the plaintiff's
grantor's deed had been recorded.' 9 Thus, the plaintiff delivered the purchase
money for the land without knowing that title still rested in a remote grantor.
Before the plaintiff had been able to perfect his title to the land, the remote
grantor sold the property to a third party who prevailed in an action against the
plaintiff to quiet title to the land. 2° Three years after the negligently performed
title search, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against his
attorney. 21 The Louisiana court of appeals dismissed the action, holding that all
malpractice actions are tortious in nature and are governed by a one year statute
of limitations. 22 The court also noted that although counsel for the plaintiff
contended the suit was within the longer statute of limitations for contract
actions, there was no alternative allegation in the petition alleging breach of con-
tract." Had the court been more flexible in its interpretation of the plaintiff's
pleadings, the plaintiff's claim would have survived. 24
The choice of applicable statute of limitations for a case in the borderland of
tort and contract does not always result in the plaintiff's action being
" Id. at 258-59.
" Id. at 259.
" Id. at 258. The attorney brought his action for legal fees less than six years after the
client refused to pay. Connecticut's contract statute of limitations provides the plaintiff with six
years in which to bring an action. CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-577 (1979). See note 9 supra.
" 374 A.2d at 259.
Id. at 260.
271 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1972).
18
 Id. at 289.
j9 Id. at 289-90.
20 Id. at 290.
21 Id.
22 Id.
25 Id.
24 For similar cases, see,	 Yazzi v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan and Tenner, 593 F.2d 100
(9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Gold, 71 A.D.2d 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1979); Goodstein v.
Weinberg, 219 Va. 105, 245 S.E.2d 140 (1978).
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dismissed." Nickerson and Box, however, illustrate the arbitrary nature of many
of the decisions, as well as the potential for abuse of judicial discretion. 2° Closely
related to the question of which statute of limitations to apply is the question of
when the cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes. In this area
too, the courts struggle to decide which head — contract or tort — will rule the
legal malpractice creature.
Since most statutes of limitations provide that the period within which an
action can be brought is to be computed from the time when the cause of action
accrues," the date of accrual is as crucial as the length of the statutory period.
Traditionally, a contract action accrues at the time of breach." Upon violation
of the rights established by the contract, the plaintiff may bring an action for at
least nominal recovery without proof of actual damages. 29
 Thus, if the court
views a legal malpractice action as contractual, the statutory period will have
begun to run at the time of the defendant's wrongful conduct. The result may be
that before the plaintiff has suffered actual harm from the attorney's malprac-
tice, or perhaps before he is even aware of the attorney's malpractice, his action
will be barred by the statute of limitations."
Should the court decide the action sounds in tort, however, the statutory
period cannot commence until the plaintiff has suffered an actual loss or damage
from the defendant's misconduct. 3' Yet this approach also can lead to a
plaintiff's suit being barred before he learns of his injury. For instance, the
injury to a plaintiff whose attorney negligently allows the statute oflimitations to
run on his claim occurs at the date of the claim's dismissal. Consequently, the
legal malpractice suit would accrue at that date under the injury rule, not when
the plaintiff learns of the negligent act." As a result, an increasing number of
tort cases have adopted the "discovery rule," holding that a cause of action does
" See,	 , Alter v. Michael, 50 Cal. Rptr. 533, 413 P.2d 153 (1966); Carney v. Finn,
145 N.J. Super. 234, 367 A.2d 458 (1976); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 179-80, 288 P.
265, 268 (1930). See also cases discussed in text at notes 54-65 infra.
26
 For cases holding the contract statute of limitation is applicable to legal malpractice
actions, set, Sittons v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967); Jackson v. Zito, 314 So. 2d 401
(La. App. 1975); Tel-Twelve Shopping Center v. Sterling Garrett Constr. Co., 34 Mich. App.
434, 191 N.W.2d 484 (1971); Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
27 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 52-577 (1979); MO. ANN. STAT. 5 516.100 (Vernon
1949); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 893.52 (West 1966). See generally Note, Developments in the Law — Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Statutes of Limitations].
28 See J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 5 233 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
29 Id.
'° See, e.g., Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 180 (1830) (Attorney committed
"fatal misnomer" in handling of his client's claim which resulted in dismissal of the suit. Held, the
client's cause of action accrued at the date of the negligent act, not when the damage became dis-
coverable.) See also Hoffman v. Insurance Co. of North America, 241 Ga. 328, 245 S.E.2d 287
(1978) (dicta); Dolce v. Gamberdino, 60I11. App. 3d 124, 376 N.E.2d 273 (1978); Troy's Stereo
Center, Inc. v. Hodson, 39 N.C. App. 591, 251 S.E.2d 673 (1979).
31 Statutes of Limitations, supra note 27, at 1201; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, S 30 at 144 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
32 See, e.g., Hood v. McConemy, 53 F. R.D. 435 (D.C. Del. 1971). See also Cordial v.
Grimm, 346 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. App. 1976); Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977).
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not accrue until the negligence is discovered or should reasonably have been dis-
covered by the plaintiff."
The decision whether a legal malpractice suit sounds in tort or contract can
thus have a profound effect on the accrual issue. If the action is viewed as
tortious in nature, the court could apply the discovery rule to postpone the
accrual date and preserve the suit. If the court views the suit as contractual,
however, the action will accrue at the time of the breach. In Master Mortgage Cor-
poration v. Byers, 34 for example, a Georgia court of appeals held that because a
particular action in legal malpractice was grounded in contract, it accrued at the
date of the negligent act. 35 The plaintiff in Byers, a mortgage company, sued its
former attorney in contract for defectively performed title searches. 36 The
attorney contended that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's
claims." The Byers court agreed, stating that whether Master Mortgage knew of
the defendant's error at the time of the breach was irrelevant to the issue of when
the contract statute of limitations began to run." Application of tort law's dis-
covery rule would have preserved the plaintiff's claim, and allowed him a trial
on the merits.
In summary, the form in which the legal malpractice plaintiff brings his suit
may be the sole basis for the dismissal of the claim if the court adheres to tradi-
tional rules of tort and contract regarding the operation of statutes of limitation.
The contract statute of limitations is likely to provide the plaintiff with more
time in which to bring his claim." The application of the tort discovery rule,
however, will postpone the accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff is
aware of the injury, or reasonably is able to ascertain such injury.°
B. Survivability of the Action
The same historical distinctions between tort and contract that plague the
legal malpractice plaintiff regarding the application of statutes of limitations,
exist in the area of survivability of the action as well. Were courts to adhere to
traditional distinctions between tort and contract, a legal malpractice action
brought in contract would survive the death of either party, 4' but one brought in
" Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan, & Tenner, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979); Sorenson v.
Povlikowski, 94 Nev. 440, 581 P.2d 851 (1978); McKee v. Riordan, 116 N.H. 729,366 A.2d 472
(1976).
34 130 Ga. App. 97, 202 S.E.2d 566 (1973).
" Id. at 98, 202 S.E.2d at 568.
36 Id. at 97, 202 S.E.2d at 567.
" Id.
" Id., 202 S.E.2d at 568.
99
 Statutes of Limitations, supra note 27, at 1193; Note Tort in Contract: A New Statute of Limita-
tions, 52 OREGON L. REV. 91, 92 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tort in Contract].
'° Should a court fail to apply the discovery rule to tort cases as well, the tort and contract
plaintiffs are in identical, undesirable predicaments. See, e.g., Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528,
180 N.W.2d 521 (1970).
4 ' Price v. Holmes, 198 Kan. 100, 106, 422 P.2d 976, 982 (1967). See generally Pollard v.
United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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tort would not." Statutes in many states, however, provide for the survival of all
but certain specified tort actions.'" In these states, then, it would appear that a
legal malpractice action brought in tort would survive the death of either party,
unless such actions were specifically excluded from the operation of the statute.
Yet, until recently, some courts preserved the traditional distinctions regarding
survivability through creative interpretations of the statutes.
In Connors v. Newton National Bank," for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that a legal malpractice action grounded in tort did
not survive the death of the defendant." The plaintiff in Connors brought a tort
action against the estate of her attorney for negligence in pursuing a personal
injury claim." The applicable statute provided in part that, in addition to
actions which survive under common law, certain intentional torts and actions
"for damage to real or personal property" survive." The Connors court viewed
the plaintiff as seeking to recover for the negligence of the deceased in pursuing
her claim, but not for injury to her personal property." Because the court failed
to view the action as coming under a statutory exception, the common law rule
that tort actions abate at the death of a party barred the plaintiff's claim."
The Connors rationale formed the basis for the decision of an Illinois court of
appeals, Butterman v. Chamales . 5° The defendant attorney in Butterman was sued
for negligence in failing to pursue pending litigation in state court and for
allowing the statute of limitations to run on the plaintiff's suit in federal court
against a stock brokerage firm. 5 ' Applying a survival statute like that applied by
the Massachusetts court in Connors, the Butterman court reached a similar conclu-
sion, finding that a tort action for legal malpractice was not an action for injury
to personal property, and thus did not survive under the statute." The court also
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the suit was based on a breach of contract
and dismissed the claim without a trial on the merits."
Thus, for a legal malpractice action to survive the death of a party, it must
either be based on a breach of contract, or be within the scope of the state's
survival statute. Connors and Butterman illustrate how a court can preserve tradi-
" Connors v. Newton Nat'l Bank, 336 Mass. 649, 650, 147 N.E.2d 185, 186 (1958).
See generally Chiagouris v. Jovan, 43 III. App. 2d 220, 193 N.E.2d 205 (1963); Briggs v. Cohen, 603
S.W.2d 20 (Mo. App. 1980); PROSSER, supra note 31, 5 126 at 899.
" See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, S 3701 (1974) which provides: "All causes of action,
except actions for defamation, malicious prosecution, or upon penal statutes, shall survive . . . ."
Id. See also S.C. CODE .§ 15-5-90 (1976).
4* 336 Mass. 649, 147 N.E.2d 185 (1958).
" Id. at 650, 147 N.E.2d at 186.
46 Id. at 649, 147 N.E.2d at 186.
47 Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, 1 (1958)). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 228, 5 1 provides in relevant part: "In addition to the actions which survive by the common
law, the following shall survive: . . . (d) for damage to real or personal property. . ." Id.
" 336 Mass. at 650, 147 N.E.2d at 186.
" Id. at 649, 147 N.E.2d at 186.
'° 73 III. App. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 81 (1966).
" Id. at 401, 220 N.E.2d at 82.
53 Id. at 403, 220 N.E.2d at 83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 110K , 5 27-6 (1978) provides in part:
"In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive:
. . . actions to recover damages for injury to real or personal property . . ." Id.
33
 73 [II. App. 2d at 403.04, 220 N.E.2d at 83.
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tional distinctions between tort and contract through manipulative statutory
interpretation in order to bar a plaintiff's action of legal malpractice. Just as in
the areas of statute of limitations and accrual date, strict adherence to the tradi-
tional rules of tort and contract regarding survivability can result in the legal
malpractice plaintiff finding his action barred because of the form in which it
was brought.
II. APPLICATION OF CONTORT PRINCIPLES
IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Because of the recognized similarity between actions of legal malpractice
brought in tort and those brought in contract, courts are showing a tendency to
overlook distinctions in doctrine by applying the principle that recurring fact
situations deserve similar treatment. As a result, rules regarding the length and
accrual dates of statutes of limitations and survivability of the action all have
undergone changes.
A. Statute of Limitations
The preceding discussion of the choice of statute of limitations in legal mal-
practice actions demonstrated that courts sometimes read a complaint strictly as
one of tort or contract, thus barring the plaintiff's claim. Not all courts,
however, act in such rigid accordance with the traditional rules of tort and con-
tract. In Registered Country Homebuilders, Inc. v. Stebbins," the plaintiff sued his
attorney for damages resulting from a negligently performed title search. 55 The
defendant argued that the action was in tort for negligence and consequently
barred by the tort statute of limitations . 56 The New York supreme court dis-
agreed and applied the longer contract statute of limitations, even though the
plaintiff's complaint did not formally state a claim for breach of contract. 57 The
court noted: "Though the complaint does not expressly allege that the defen-
dant impliedly undertook to make a complete and accurate title search and cer-
tificate, a reading of the complaint as a whole leads to the inference that such an
undertaking on the part of the defendant was implied." 58 Unlike the Louisiana
court of appeals in Box v. Karam, 59 the Stebbins court was flexible in its interpre-
tation of the pleadings, thus enabling the plaintiff's claim to be heard.
More recently, courts have gone further than merely characterizing the
specific facts of a legal malpractice case as tortious or contractual for the purpose
of preserving the plaintiff's claim. The fundamental similarity between contract
and tort cases of legal malpractice has led some courts to rule that such plaintiffs
have a legitimate claim under either heading. In Jackson v. Zito," the plaintiff
brought an action of legal malpractice in tort against his attorney for failure to
prosecute the plaintiff's workmen's compensation claim. 61 The trial court ruled
54 14 Misc. 2d 821, 179 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1958).
55 Id., 179 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
56 Id.
" Id. at 823, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
58 Id.
59 271 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1972). See text at notes 17-24 supra.
6° 314 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1975).
" Id. at 403.
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the one-year tort statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's legal malpractice
claim. 62
 The Louisiana court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff's tort claim was
barred, but noted that "one set of circumstances can give rise to more than one
cause of action, and each of those causes has its own prescriptive period." 63
Consequently, although the plaintiff's tort claim was properly barred, the
existence of the attorney client relationship meant there was an action in con-
tract open to the plaintiff which he deserved to have litigated." The court was
empowered to ignore the plaintiff's original theory of the case in order to reach a
result which was "just, legal, and proper upon the record." 65
The concern of the Jackson court for a just and proper resolution of a legal
malpractice claim can also be seen in recent decisions regarding accrual of the
cause of action. In Hendrikson v. Sears , 66
 for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ruled that tort law's discovery rule of accrual should be
applied to all actions of legal malpractice under the principle that "limitation
statutes should apply equally to similar fact patterns regardless of the form of
proceeding.. . . " 67 The plaintiffs in Hendrikson purchased land in 1961 in reliance
upon a title search negligently performed by their attorney." Nine years later,
prospective purchasers refused to buy the property from the plaintiffs because of
a recorded easement on the land. 69
 The plaintiff suffered a loss both in
modifying the easement and in the ultimate sale of the property." In 1971, the
plaintiffs commenced a legal malpractice action against the attorney." Because
the action was commenced ten years after the attorney's malpractice, the crucial
issue was the time of accrual. Under a contractual analysis, the cause of action
would have accrued at the time of the breach." Under the discovery rule of tort
theory, however, the date of accrual could be postponed until the plaintiff
discovered or reasonably should have discovered his injury — that is, at the date
of the prospective sale." The Hendrikson court held that the cause of action did
" Id. at 404.
" Id. at 408.
64 Id.
n Id. See also Johnson v. Daye, 363 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1978), where the court noted: "A
malpractice action against an attorney may state a claim both ex delido and ex contractu. . . . This is
true even though the petition be couched in language asserting a claim based on the negligence of
the attorney." Id. at 941; Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491
P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971), where the court stated:
Legal malpractice consists of the failure of an attorney "to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the tasks which they undertake .. . When such failure proximately
causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort. Since in the usual case, the attorney
undertakes to perform his duties pursuant to a contract with the client, the attorney's
failure to exercise the requisite skill and care is also a breach of an express or implied
term of that contract.
Id. at 180-81, 491 P.2d at 422-23; 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
66
 365 Mass. 83, 310 N. E.2d 131 (1974).
67 Id. at 85, 310 N.E.2d at 132.
66 Id. at 84, 310 N.E.2d at 132.
69 Id.
7° Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 86, 310 N.E.2d at 133.
72 Id. at 83, 89, 310 N.E.2d at 132, 135.
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not accrue until the malpractice was discovered, or reasonably should have been
discovered by the plaintiff."
In reaching its conclusion, the Hendrikson court expressly refused to deter-
mine whether the legal malpractice action was essentially an action in tort or in
contract." Instead, the court examined the practical consequences of applying
the contract accrual rule to legal malpractice actions. 76 The opinion emphasized
the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his client," as well as the
client's reliance on the attorney's skill." The court observed that an attorney
does much of his work outside the client's view and that, consequently, the client
is not likely to recognize professional negligence even if he should see it." For
these reasons, the court found it unfair for the client's cause of action to accrue at
such an "inherently unknowable" date, regardless of whether the suit was
brought in tort or in contract."
Cases like Hendrikson which adopt the discovery rule of accrual for legal
malpractice actions have stressed the similarity of contract and tort suits of this
kind. 8' A similar analysis has recently been applied by courts which in the past
had adhered to traditional rules of survivorship in legal malpractice cases.
B. Survivability of the Action
An examination of the results of adhering to traditional rules of tort and
contract on survivability of actions has led some courts to reevaluate the useful-
ness of such an approach. In like manner, where statutory enactments have
replaced the common law of survivability, courts are striving to reach consistent
results in both tort and contract cases. In McGill v. Lazzaro," for example, an
Illinois appeals court reconsidered the strict approach to survival of actions pre-
viously taken in that jurisdiction in Butterman v. Chamales." The plaintiff in
McGill brought an action against his attorney for professional negligence, fraud,
and breach of fiduciary duty." Following the death of the attorney, the trial
court dismissed the action, finding that the suit abated at the defendant's
death." The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision." The court
recognized that Butterman had held that legal malpractice actions were not
covered by the Illinois survival statute, which provides for survival of actions for
injury to personal property." Nevertheless, the McGill court found a subsequent
74 Id. at 91, 310 N.E.2d at 136.
" Id. at 86, 310 N.E.2d at 133.
" Id. at 90-91, 310 N.E.2d at 135-36.
" Id. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135.
" Id. at 91, 3'10 N.E.2d at 136.
79 Id. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 135.
'° Id. at 90, 310 N.E.2d at 136.
" See, e.g., Mumford v. Staton, Whaley and Price, 254 Md. 697, 714, 255 A.2d 359,
367 (1969); Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 404, 553 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1976).
82 62 Ill. App. 3d 151, 379 N.E.2d 16 (1978).
73 Ill. App. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 81 (1966). See text at notes 50-53 .supra.
84 62 Ill. App. 3d at 152, 379 N.E.2d at 17 (1978).
85
 Id.
86 Id. at 154, 379 N.E.2d at 18.
67 62 Ill. App. 3d at 153-54, 379 N.E.2d at 18.
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decision, Jones v. Siesennop, 88
 to be more persuasive. In Jones, the court had
expanded its definition of an injury to personal property to include a legal mal-
practice suit." The Jones court held that the word "property" as used in the sur-
vival statute is a generic term "and its meaning in any case must be determined
by the sense in which it is used." 9° Consequently, according to the Jones court,
the statute should not be giVen a narrow, technical construction, but should be
construed with reference to conditions of present-day life." Following the spirit
ofJones, the McGill court ruled that because legal malpractice results in an injury
to the client's personal property, the action survives under the statute. 92
In 1979, a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion dealt more
explicitly with the effect that merging rules of survivability has on traditional
distinctions between tort and contract. In McStowe v. Bornstein," the plaintiff
brought a tort action against the estate of his attorney, who had failed to com-
mence an action on behalf of the plaintiff before the statute of limitations had
run. 94
 Under Massachusetts law, contract actions survive the death of the
defendant, but tort actions, for the most part, do not. 95 Instead of correcting the
plaintiff's pleading error by characterizing the suit as one in contract, the court
stated that a client's claim against his attorney has aspects of both tort and con-
tract actions. 96
 Because a legal malpractice suit brought in tort differs so slightly
from one brought in contract, the court found it would be unjust to treat the two
suits differently." The court noted, "We have looked with disfavor on rigid pro-
cedural distinctions between contract and tort and are more concerned today
with substance than with form." 98
 The court concluded that the contractual
aspects of the parties' relationship permitted the action to survive the
defendant's death regardless of whether the suit was brought under a tort or con-
tract heading. 99
In summary, some courts have shown a tendency to overlook historical dis-
tinctions between tort and contract in cases of legal malpractice. The essential
similarity between the suits militates in favor of applying similar rules regarding
statute of limitations, accrual date and survivability of the action.
88
 55 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 371 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
" Id. at 1041, 371 N.E.2d at 895.
'° Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487,491, 216 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1966)).
The Jones court held an action against an attorney for professional negligence survived the death of
the plaintiff and could be pursued by her personal representative. 55 Ill. App. 3d at 1042, 371
N.E.2d at 896.
" 55 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 371 N.E.2d at 895 (quoting McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d
487, 490-91, 216 N.E.2d 140, 143).
92
 62 Ill. App. 3d 154, 379 N.E.2d 18 (1978).
95
 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1024, 388 N.E.2d 674 (1979).
94 Id., 388 N.E.2d at 675.
95 Id. at 1027, 388 N.E.2d at 676. See Sliski v. Kral, 361 Mass. 313, 315, 279 N.E.2d 924,
927 (1972) (contract actions survive); Gallagher v. First Nat'l Bank, 346 Mass. 587, 589-90, 195
N.E.2d 68, 69 (1964) (tort actions abate).
98 Id. at 1027, 388 N.E.2d at 676.
97 Id. at 1029, 388 N.E.2d at 677.
98 Id .
99 Id.
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III. THE CONTORT OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: AN EVALUATION
As the more recent legal malpractice cases discussed above indicate, courts
are showing a reluctance to dispose of similar cases in dissimilar fashions solely
because one suit is brought in tort and the other in contract. This judicial atti-
tude is in keeping with a general trend toward a merger of tort and contract)" In
determining whether the field of legal malpractice is a proper area for further
development of what some have called "contorts ,'"° 1 the rationale for rules of
tort and contract which existed at the time of their inception must be examined,
and their appropriateness in the modern action of legal malpractice must be
evaluated. It is submitted that the original justifications for certain distinctions
between tort and contract no longer exist, and that justice demands equal rules
be applied to all plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions, regardless of the form in
which the suit is brought.
A. Statute of Limitations
Traditionally, the length of the statute of limitations for tort actions has
been shorter than that for contract actions.'" The forces of the industrial revolu-
tion provide one rationale for this distinction. The rise of industrialization and
mechanized modes of transportation as well as factory facilities dramatically
increased the number of personal injury suits in the nineteenth century.'" To
protect the new industrial forces from crippling compensation payments, the
time allotted for such actions was considerably reduced.'" Another reason for
the shorter statute of limitations for tort actions is evidentiary in nature. The
shorter the time allowed between injury and litigation, the greater the chance of
a clear evaluation of both the source and extent of the injuries.' 05
The tort action of legal malpractice, however, differs greatly from the tort
actions with which the drafters of nineteenth century statutes of limitations were
concerned. It is doubtful whether the position of the legal profession today war-
rants application of special rules designed to protect attorneys from tort liability.
The economic development of the nation is not implicated in actions of legal
malpractice as it was in nineteenth century actions against fledging industries.
In addition, the tort action of legal malpractice is not likely to involve proof of
bodily injury, which includes evidence susceptible to the wear and tear of time
and thus warrants a shorter statutory period. The evidentiary concerns of a tort
action of legal malpractice are identical to those of a contract action of legal mal-
practice. Both suits are primarily concerned with establishing the terms of the
agreement and determining whether the defendant's conduct constituted a
violation of that agreement. Therefore, under a functional analysis, there is no
100 See note 1 supra.
1 ° 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 90.
102 Staltdes of Limitations, supra note 27, at 1193; Tort in Contract, supra note 39, at 92.
In Statutes of Limitations, supra note 27, at 1193.
t" Id.
'° Id.
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reason why one plaintiff should be subject to a shorter statutory period merely
because he had the misfortune of bringing the suit in the "wrong" form.
Apart from the evidentiary concerns discussed above, the statute of limita-
tions also is concerned with overall fairness to the defendant. There comes a
time, it has been observed, when the defendant "ought to be secure in his
reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obli-
gations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.' " 106 Presum-
ably, however, legislatures were as well aware of these purposes when they
designed the contract statute of limitations as when they designed the tort
statute. Thus, if the argument for applying the shorter tort statute of limitations
is that the contract statute gives too much time in which to bring the action, the
proper course is for the legislature to determine what a fair period is for any legal
malpractice action. In 1979, California enacted such a statute which provides
that both tort and contract actions of legal malpractice expire one year after the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the wrongful act, or four years from
the date of the wrongful act, whichever occurs first.'"
In the absence of legislative action, however, courts should apply the
statute of limitations most favorable to the plaintiff. If the longer statutory
period will result in an onslaught of legal malpractice actions, the crucial
problem to be addressed is the standard of care practiced by attorneys, not the
period in which clients have to bring the action .'°8 To dismiss a tort suit on the
basis of the statute of limitations when a contract suit, in which identical issues of
proof will be raised, is still viable, indicates that courts are more concerned with
adherence to tradition, than with legitimate evidentiary concerns.
For a court to read one interpretation of a plaintiff's suit as controlling in
'" Id. at 1185 (quoting Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
1°7 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 5 340.6 (West 1979) provides:
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual
fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one
year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the
date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for
commencement of legal action exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled
during the time that any of the following exist:
(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury;
(2) The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject
matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred;
(3) The attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission when such facts are known to the attorney, except that this subdivision shall toll
only the four year limitation; and
(4) The plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which restricts the plaintiff's
ability to commence legal action.
(b) In an action based upon an instrument in writing, the effective date of which
depends upon some act or event of the future, the period of limitations provided for by
this section shall commence to run upon the occurrence of such act or event.
Id.
101 If the standard of care demanded of attorneys is such that they will be subject to over-
whelming liability for malpractice, the solution is to determine a truly reasonable standard of care,
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order to preserve the claim is not an unprecedented practice. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure encourage such behavior. Under the Federal Rules, a plain-
tiff is allowed to present his claim alternatively in tort or contract. 109 He may
even choose not to characterize it as either of the two."° If the court can sense
from the "short and plain statement of the claim" 111 that the pleader has a valid
action under any heading, the Federal Rules require the suit to be regarded as
brought in the appropriate form." 2 Thus under the Federal Rules, it is well
within the court's discretion to characterize a legal malpractice suit as arising in
tort or in contract for the purpose of preserving the claim.
In sum, differences in the statutory periods for tort and contract statutes of
limitations seem best explained by blind adherence to tradition. There has been
no conscious decision by the legislature to narrow the scope of tort liability of
attorneys. Moreover, none of the evidentiary concerns that lie at the core of all
statutes of limitations warrant a shorter statute of limitations for legal malprac-
tice suits brought in tort than for those brought in contract. For this reason, state
legislatures should determine what an appropriate statutory period is for all
legal malpractice actions and enact such legislation. Absent such legislative
action, should the statute of limitations expire under only one form of the legal
malpractice suit, the suit should be preserved under the alternative heading.
Similar policy considerations indicate that the date of accrual for all causes
of action based on legal malpractice should be the same. It is submitted that this
date of accrual should be the date of discovery. The discovery rule operates to
postpone the running of the statute of limitations until that time when the plain-
tiff discovers, or should have discovered, the injury." 3 Courts have applied the
rule to cases of professional negligence against doctors," 4 accountants,"3 stock-
not to arbitrarily dismiss certain suits because of their failure to conform to traditional rules of
form.
Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (D.S.C. 1974). See FED.
R. CD/. P. 8 (a), (e)(2). One author notes: "The pleader may allege matters alternatively or hypo-
thetically and .. . the allegations may even be inconsistent. The pleader cannot be required to
elect among his allegations, but is entitled to have all his claims and defenses considered by the
trier of facts." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 322 (3d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. See also Berry Ref. Co. v. Salemi, 353 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1965).
10 In speaking of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Wright remarks:
"There is no requirement of any 'theory of pleadings.' Contrary to the rule in some code states,
the complaint is not to be dismissed because the plaintiff's lawyer has misconceived the nature of
the claim, if he is entitled to any relief on any theory." WRIGHT, supra note 109, at 321. See also 5 C.
WRIGHT sz A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL S 1201 n.11 (1969).
11 "A pleading shall contain . .. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." FED, R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
" See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e), (f). Professor Wright states:
Pleadings are to be construed so as to substantial justice. The old rule that a plead-
ing must be construed most strongly against the pleader is no longer followed. Instead
the court will not require technical exactness or make refined inferences against the
pleader but will construe the pleading in his favor if justice so requires.
WRIGHT, supra note 109 at 322. See also Hazen v. Western Union Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 766, 770 (6th
Cir. 1975).
113 PROSSER, supra note 31, 30, at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
"' Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974).
"' Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967).
558	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:545
brokers,'16
 title companies," and insurance agents."e Courts adopting the dis-
covery rule in professional negligence cases usually emphasize the special posi-
tion that the professional holds in relation to his client." 9 Because of the reliance
placed on the professional's work, and because most of his work is done outside
of his client's view, it is difficult for a potential plaintiff to know if he has a claim
of malpractice until the effects of the act impact upon him at a later date. At that
point, the plaintiff also may discover his cause of action is barred by the statute
of limitations. In recognition of such concerns, several states have now extended
the discovery rule to actions of legal malpractice.' 2°
In the absence of such legislative action, the justification for judicial
extension of the discovery rule to tort actions of legal malpractice is clear. Where
there is an "inherently unknowable" harm, justice is best served by postponing
accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff reasonably should learn of the
harm. As previously noted, 12' several courts have extended the rule to contract
actions of legal malpractice as well. This is a proper response. All of the factors
that militate towards the adoption of the discovery rule for tort actions do so with
equal force for contract actions. The fiduciary nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship deserves no less protection because the plaintiff brings his suit in
contract. For an attorney to escape liability on the basis of his client's unfor-
tunate choice of which form to bring his suit in is unjust. As the California
Supreme Court noted upon its adoption of the discovery rule for causes of legal
malpractice,
Today then, is no time to perpetuate an anachronistic interpretation of
the statute of limitations that permits the attorney to escape obliga-
tions which other professionals must bear. The legal calling can ill
afford the preservation of a privileged protection against responsi-
bility, a privilege born of error, subject to almost universal condemna-
tion, and in present day society, anamolous.122
Adoption of the discovery rule in legal malpractice cases founded on contract as
well as tort would signal a recognition of the principle that all plaintiffs in legal
malpractice suits deserve an equal opportunity to present their claims.
B. Survivability of the Action
The contrasting rules of tort and contract regarding survivability of a claim
stem from the development of the two forms of action. Tort actions traditionally
have not survived the death of a party."' Since the tort remedy developed as an
"6 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1968).
" 7 Cook s'. Redwood Empire Title Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969).
118 United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770,
83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970).
"9
 Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188-89, 491 P.2d
421, 428-29 98 Cal. Rptr. 851, 844-45, (1971); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. at 90, 310 N.E.2d
at 135-36.
120 See note 33 supra.
121
 See text and notes at note 66 supra.
122 Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart, and Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d at 194, 491 P.2d at
433,. 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
123
 PROSSER, supra note 31, S 126, at 899.
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adjunct to criminal punishment, which naturally terminated with the
defendant's death, tort liability was considered terminated also.'" In the case of
serious crimes, the Crown would execute the defendant and confiscate all of his
property, rendering the question of survival of a personal right of action
academic.'" In the case of less serious crimes, the Crown, not the defendant,
was expected to compensate the victim."'
Originally, actions in assumpsit as well as tort, sometimes were held to ter-
minate with the death of a party.'" As time passed, however, courts viewed
justice as demanding an expanded liability on the part of an executor for actions
brought on a contract.'" A rule contrary to this view was regarded as enriching
the estate of the defendant at the expense of a party to whom a valid obligation
was owed."' Thus by the beginning of the seventeenth century the question was
settled that an action for breach of contract did not abate at the defendant's
death.'"
Today, tort defendants no longer face the drastic remedies imposed by the
Crown in sixteenth century England. Should a twentieth century defendant die
before suit is brought against him, his estate often is capable of compensating the
plaintiff. For this reason, survival statutes have been enacted to preserve certain
tort actions beyond the death of a party."' Some courts have based their decision
that legal malpractice actions survive the death of a party on the proposition that
legal malpractice actions fall within the language of its survival statute.'"
As tort and contract continue to merge in the area of legal malpractice,
however, a justification for similar rules regarding survivability apart from that
based on the survival statute is becoming clear. As the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court noted in Matowe, the existence of the contractual relationship
between the attorney and his client permits the plaintiff's claim against the
attorney to survive the attorney's death.' 33 The mere characterization of a legal
malpractice suit as tort or contract cannot destroy those aspects of the suit that
warrant survival under a contractual analysis. A plaintiff should not be denied
compensation solely because the defendant dies before the suit is resolved,
regardless of whether the action is brought in tort or in contract.
The McStowe decision completed a nationwide merger of tort and contract
rules of survivability of legal malpractice actions. Whether by statute or judicial
"4
 Id. at 898.
122 Id.
176 Id.
' 27 3 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 451, 576-78 (3d ed. 1927).
28 Id. at 452.
"29 Id.
L" Id. at 451.
" PROSSER, supra note 31, 126, at 901. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 228, 5 1
(West 1958), which reads in part: "In addition to the actions which survive by the common law,
the following shall survive: . . (2) Actions of tort (a) for assault, battery, imprisonment or other
damage to the person . . . or (d) for damage to real or personal property." Id. See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, 5 3701 (1974); S.C. CODE 15-5-90 (1976).
137 See, e.g., McGill v. Lazzaro; 62 111. App. 3d 151, 379 N.E.2d 16 (1978). See also
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 5 32 (1977 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
MALLEN & LEVIT ] .
153 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1029, 388 N.E.2d at 677.
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decision, every state now agrees that an action of legal malpractice survives the
death of a party.'" The statute of limitations and date of accrual cases, discussed
above,'" have shown a similar trend towards merger of rules of tort and con-
tract. It remains to be seen if that trend will continue in another area tra-
ditionally affected by the rules of tort and contract, that of damages.
IV. DAMAGES
As has been demonstrated, many courts have shown an inclination to
remove obstacles to legal malpractice actions based on distinctions between tort
and contract. Nevertheless, at present, the choice of tort or contract still can
bring different types of recovery for a legal malpractice plaintiff. Tort damages
may include recovery for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and exemplary
damages.'" Contract recovery, however, is limited, for the most part, to expec-
tation damages."' The remainder of this note will discuss the traditional distinc-
tions between tort and contract damages in legal malpractice actions and
examine ways in which these distinctions are eroding. It will be submitted that
this erosion should continue, eventually enabling the legal malpractice plaintiff
to recover under both tort and contract theory where justice so requires.
A. Distinctions Between Tort and Contract Damages
in Actions of Legal Malpractice
Whether the legal malpractice action is brought in tort or in contract, the
rules regarding expectation, or direct, damages are the same.'" An attorney is
liable for all damages proximately caused by his wrongful act .139
 The measure of
the damages is the difference between what the plaintiff's pecuniary position is
and what it would have been had the attorney acted competently.' 4°
The recovery of consequential damages, however, depends to a great
extent on the tort-contract distinction. Consequential damages have been
defined as "those additional injuries which are a proximate result of the
attorney's negligence but which do not flow directly from or concern the
objective of the retention."' The term includes damages for pain and suffering,
133 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 132, 32.
1 " See text and notes at 54-65 & 66-81 supra.
136 W .
 Prosser, J. Wade, & V. Schwartz, TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 542, 588
(6th ed. 1976).
137 C. MCCORMICK, HANDSOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, 55 137, 138 (1935) [herein-
after cited as MCCORMICK].
1 " McClain v. Faroane, 369 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Del. Super. 1977).
' 39 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 132 5 134. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349,
361-62, 530 P.2d 589, 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629 (1975).
140 In Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff 'd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th
Cir. 1967), for example, the plaintiff claimed his attorney negligently failed to file suit before the
statute of limitations expired. The court stated that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover an
amount equal to that which he would have recovered had the suit been properly instituted, if he
could prove he would have prevailed in that original suit. Id. at 67. See also Duncan v. Lord, 409 F.
Supp. 687 (E.D. Penn. 1976); Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975); Ware v. Durham, 268 S. E,2d 668 (Ga. 1980); Flynn v. Judge, 149 App. Div. 278, 280, 133
N.Y.S. 794, 796 (1912).
t." MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 132, $ 131.
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mental anguish, and injury to reputation.'" Recovery of such damages has tra-
ditionally been allowed in tort,'" but not in contract.'"
In McEvoy v. Helikson,' 45 for example, the plaintiff sued the defendant for his
failure to deliver passports to his clients. The passports would have enabled a
transfer of custody of the plaintiff's child.'" The court held that the infringement
of the plaintiff's legal right to the custody of his child entitled him to recover for
the anguish and mental suffering caused by the loss of the child."' Such damages
were perfectly allowable in a tort action of legal malpractice.
A legal malpractice action brought in contract, however, is more restrictive
as to the nature of consequential damages recoverable. In McClain v. Faraone,'"
for instance, the plaintiff sued his attorney for the negligent failure to discover an
encumbrance on real estate on which the attorney had performed a title
search.'" The court allowed only direct damages to be recovered.'54 The court
recognized that a pecuniary injury caused by a breach of contract is likely to be
accompanied by mental suffering.' 5 ' Nevertheless, the court followed traditional
contract doctrine and refused to allow recovery for such an injury.'"
As in the rules regarding consequential damages, tort and contract theory
also differ on the availability of punitive damages. Punitive damages are not
recoverable for legal malpractice suits brought in contract.'" Yet the rule in tort
actions is to allow such damages if the defendant has been guilty of fraud,
malice, or oppression.'" In Hall v. Wright,' 55 for example, the plaintiff was
allowed to recover punitive damages in tort for her attorney's malpractice. The
plaintiff in Hall alleged that her attorney fraudulently represented that the
vendor with whom she was about to trade homes had a valid title to the land . 156
The plaintiff relied on the defendant's representations and consummated the
transaction.'" When the true owner made his claim to the property known, the
defendant deceived the plaintiff into signing a promissory note which obligated
her to pay for a house for which she had already traded her own.' 55 At trial, the
plaintiff was awarded punitive damages because of the defendant's fraud . 159 The
Iowa Supreme Court sustained the award.'"
142 Id .
13 See text at note 136 supra.
144 MCCORMiCK, supra note 137, $ 138.
145 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977).
146 Id. at 783-84, 562 P.2d at 541-42.
' 47 Id. at 789, 562 P.2d at 544.
148 369 A.2d 1090 (Del. Super. 1977).
149 Id. at 1092.
' 5° Id. at 1092, 1094-95.
181 Id. at 1094.
142 Id. at 1094-95.
"3 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 132, 146.
154 See PROSSER, supra note 31, 5 2, at 9-10.
"5 261 Iowa 758, 156 N.W.2d 661 (1968).
"6 Id. at 765, 156 N.W.2d at 665.
" 7 Id.
1313 Id. at 764, 156 N.W.2d at 665. The plaintiff testified: "I said, 'Well, Bob, wait until I
get up and get my eyeglasses so I can read it.' He says, 'You don't have to read behind me.' He
said, 'I'm your attorney. Just sign this.' So, I signed it." (sic) Id.
19 Id. at 760, 156 N.W.2d at 662.
160 Id. at'773, 156 N.W.2d at 670. An award of punitive damages similarly may be sus-
562	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 22:545
Following the traditional contract rule, however, punitive damages cannot
be recovered. 16 ' In Hillhouse v. McDowell,' 62 for instance, the client sued his
attorney for failure to prosecute his personal injury suit before the statute of
limitations had run . 163
 The court characterized the suit as a contract action,
based on the violation of the defendant's implied promise to exercise reasonable
skill and diligence.'" Turning to the question of damages, the court held that
such a breach of contract renders "the attorney liable for the loss resulting, but
no more.' "65
The differing rules regarding damages in tort and contract are especially
significant in cases where contract damages are the only damages available to
the plaintiff. When a client discovers his attorney's negligence before the direct
damage is actually incurred, a contract action will offer nominal damages for the
breach itself.' 66 A tort action, however, cannot accrue until the plaintiff has
suffered harm from the negligent act.'" Therefore, a plaintiff who discovers his
attorney's negligence before the resulting damage is incurred does not have a
cause of action in tort. The dilemma of a plaintiff who discovers her attorney's
negligence too soon to recover in tort is illustrated in Marchand v. Miazza.165 In
Marchand, the plaintiff sued her attorneys for their failure to protect her rights in
certain real and personal property.' 69 The plaintiff had dismissed the defendants
and retained new counsel."° The other counsel pursued the claims that the
plaintiff formerly had entrusted to the defendants."' At the time of the malprac-
tice action, these claims were still pending. 12 The court noted that the malprac-
tice action could be filed in contract as well as in tort, but treated it as a tort
suit.'" Thus, no recovery could be granted for the defendant's wrongful conduct
until the resulting damages had been shown to exist. 14 Had the court treated the
suit as arising in contract, the act of negligence alone would have been sufficient
to warrant at least nominal damages." 5
Distinctions between tort and contract play an important role in deciding
tained if the attorney has shown such lack of care or attention, or such great indifference, that
malice may be imputed to his actions. Gay v. McCaughan, 272 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1959).
' 6 ' See, e. g. , Carroll v. Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 175, 237 S.E.2d 566, 572 (1977);
Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 687, 277 S.W.2d 377, 379 (1955).
167
 410 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1966).
163
 Id. at 162.
164 Id. at 166.
165 Id.
166 See McCORmIGK, supra note 137, § 20 at 85.
167 PROSSER, supra note 31, § 31 at 143.
165 151 So. 2d 372 (La. App. 1963).
166 Id. at 373-74.
,7° Id. at 374.
171 Id.
172 Id.
' 73 Id. at 375.
'" Id. In a related context, the California Supreme Court has noted: "If the allegedly
negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort . . . . The mere
breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of
future harm — not yet realized — does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence." Budd
v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971).
176 See text at note 166 supra.
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the extent of damages recoverable in an action of legal malpractice. The plaintiff
may be entitled to a wide scope of damages, or, indeed, none at all, depending
on the form in which he brings his suit. Some courts, however, have shown a
willingness to base their decisions on damages in legal malpractice actions on the
facts of the case, rather than on the form in which it is brought. For example,
although traditional rules of contract restrict damages to the amount of actual
pecuniary loss, courts have awarded exemplary damages where a breach of con-
tract is accompanied by an intentional wrong or malicious conduct.' 76 Singleton v.
Foreman'" is an illustration of this judicial approach. In Singleton, the plaintiff
retained the defendant to represent her in a divorce proceeding.'" The
defendant had the plaintiff sign an employment contract for his services which
provided for a contingent fee out of the proceeds from the divorce settlement.'"
Contracts for contingent fees in divorce cases are illegal under Florida law, how-
even's° When the plaintiff expressed her desire to settle the case out of court, the
defendant "exploded into a torrent of abuse," 18 ' and threatened to ruin both
Mrs. Singleton and her husband.'" The plaintiff discharged the attorney, and
sued in contract for recovery of the value of certain jewelry given to the
defendant as security under the contingent fee agreement.'" The court found
this conduct sufficient to establish a cause of action in tort for infliction of severe
emotional distress.'" Recognizing the general rule that exemplary damages are
not allowed for simple breach of contract, the court nevertheless ruled that
"where the acts constituting the breach also amount to an independent tort,
exemplary damages may be recovered."'" Because the defendant's breach of
contract also constituted the tort of severe infliction of emotional distress,
exemplary damages were recoverable although the action was brought in
contract.
In summary, a tort action offers the legal malpractice plaintiff a wider scope
of damages than does a contract action. Unless the contract plaintiff can estab-
lish that an independent intentional wrong accompanied the breach of contract,
he is not likely to recover consequential or punitive damages. A plaintiff who
brings a legal malpractice action in tort, however, is assured of the availability of
both consequential and punitive damages.
16 See, e.g., National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Va.
1972); Country Club Corp, v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Hess v.
Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968); see also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract:
The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 236 (1977); Note, The Expanding
Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975).
17 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970).
178 Id. at 965.
179 Id. at 965, 969.
' 1" Id. at 969.
1 " Id. at 967.
18 ' Id. "In the course of said obscenities, the defendant told the plaintiff that she was a
"stupid . . .'; that plaintiff did not 'have any more to say in the case than a chair in the
courtroom.'" Id.
1 " Id. at 968.
184 Id. at 971.
"5 Id.
564
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:545
B. Recovery in Legal Malpractice Actions: Damages in "Contort"?
The preceding examination of choice of statute of limitations, accrual of the
action, and survivability in legal malpractice cases has shown the extent to
which traditional rules of contract and tort influence the outcome of the suit. It
has been suggested that differences in outcome are more the result of the appli-
cation of anachronistic rules of form than of real differences between the actions.
The same is true in the area of damages. The difference in damages recoverable
in tort and contract are based on rules most appropriately confined to their
nineteenth century origins.
Tort damages began as a method of enforcing obligations by compensating
persons to whom obligations were owed but not met.' 86
 Because the object of tort
recovery was primarily to restore the plaintiff to the position he would be in had
the wrong not been committed,'" the plaintiff was allowed compensation for
mental anguish, pain and suffering, and severe emotional distress, as well as
recovery for any pecuniary loss incurred.'" If certain acts of the defendant were
outrageous enough to raise the indignation of the court, exemplary damages
also could be imposed in a tort action, both to punish the defendant and to deter
future wrongdoing.'"
As noted above, contract damages are more limited in nature than tort
damages. The reasons for this difference between the two forms of action lies in
the development of contract law, and in the economic and philosophical doc-
trines that characterized the nineteenth century.
Classical contract damage theory was influenced to a great extent by the
economic doctrine of laissez-faire .' 9° It has been noted that it is more in keeping
with the free enterprise system for the law to encourage promisees to rely on the
promises of others than to compel performance by threatening a wide scope of
damages as punishment for breach As one commentator observed, "{This at
least adds to the celebrated freedom to make contracts, a considerable freedom
to break them as well.'"92
 Rather than discouraging businessmen from leaving
old enterprises for the purpose of entering into more profitable ventures,
contract law instead "has shown a marked solicitude for men who do not keep
their promises." ' 93 Such a result harmonizes well with the free trade economy
philosophy of the Victorian era during which the law of contracts was
systemized.'"
"6
 Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts.. Its History — III, 7 HARV. L, REV. 441, 453
(1894).
767
 MCCORMICK, supra note 137, S 137, at 560-61.
"a Id. at § 88.
788
 Id. at 5 77.
'a° P. S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3 (2d ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as ATIYAH]; GILMORE, supra note 1, at 6. See generally A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979).
197 Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 1145, 1147
(1970).
192 id .
'g' Id. at 1216.
I" MCCORMICK, supra note 137, 5 138, at 566-67.
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It has been asserted that the most striking characteristic of the laissez-faire
philosophy is the narrow scope of social duty which the legal theories implicitly
assumed. 195 While tort law is recognized as having its roots in moral obligation
to some extent,' 96 classical contract law disavows any such connection between
what is ethical and what is legal. Holmes, recognized as a "great organizer" 197
of American contract law, wrote: "Every man has the right to 'break' his con-
tract if he so chooses — to pay damages instead of performing his contractual
obligation. The wicked contract breaker should pay no more than the innocent
and pure in heart." 1"
A plaintiff in a legal malpractice action brought in contract, thus
encounters a law of damages founded on nineteenth century economic theory
and legal philosophy. Yet neither principles of laissez-faire economics, nor
notions of limited social duty are appropriately applied to actions of legal mal-
practice. The existence of the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his
client means that the attorney does not have considerable freedom to "break"
his contract. Indeed, in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the
American Bar Association specifically prohibits such activity by stating: "A
lawyer shall not . . . fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with
a client for professional services. . . ." 199 Contrary to classical contract theory,
then, it is the expressed intention of the legal profession today to discourage
attorneys from breaching their contracts of employment. 200 The laissez-faire
rationale for limiting recovery to expectation damages thus does not exist in
contract actions of legal malpractice.
The narrow scope of social duty that characterized the nineteenth century
is also inappropriately applied to actions of legal malpractice. An attorney
occupies a special position of trust and reliance in today's society. The con-
tractual aspects of the attorney-client relationship in no way diminish the
fiduciary nature of the relationship. The American Bar Association has stated
that "[A lawyer's] fiduciary duty is of the highest order. . . . He is not per-
mitted to take advantage of his position of superior knowledge to impose upon
his client; nor to conceal facts of law, nor in any way to deceive him without
being held responsible therefor. "201 Consequently, the need to protect the
integrity of the legal profession, and compensate the plaintiff for his losses are as
imperative in contract actions as in tort actions. For an attorney to escape full
19'
	 supra note I, at 95.
I" PROSSER, supra note 31, 5 4, at 16-17.
197 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 6.
198 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Howe ed. 1963).
199 ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, D.R. 7-1-1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
2911 The merger of the principles of damages in tort and contract actions of legal mal-
practice is in keeping with the general trend of the law. The restricted role of the law adopted by the
nineteenth century courts has been abandoned in modern society. Today the law is viewed more as
a positive instrument for the achievement of justice. ATIYAH, supra note 190, at 11. As one observer
commented: "The decline and fall of the general theory of contract and, in most quarters, of
laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflections of the transition from nineteenth
century individualism to the welfare state and beyond." GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95-96.
201 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 199, E.C. 5-1 n.1 at 28 (1976).
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liability for his acts solely on the basis of the form in which his client brings suit is
an offense to the notions of fair play which guardians of any legal systeth must
protect and foster.
Because the historical reasons for differences in tort and contract recovery
do not apply to legal malpractice actions, courts should not be bound by tradi-
tional tort and contract distinctions in assessing damages. The suits are essen-
tially identical. If expectation or punitive damages are appropriate based on an
evaluation of the attorney's actions, the attorney should not escape such liability
because the action is brought in contract. Such a merger of tort and contract will
not necessarily result in greater liability for attorneys because the duty owed
clients remains the same under both forms. To preserve tort and contract dis-
tinctions in the area of legal malpractice is to allow the courts to mask a decision
on the merits of the case behind the artifacts of case and assumpsit. 202
CONCLUSION
An action of legal malpractice may be brought in either tort or contract.
Although the suits are almost identical in nature, differences in statutes of limi-
tations, dates of accrual, survivability, and damages may preclude a plaintiff's
action or sharply limit his recovery. A legal malpractice action brought in tort,
however, is not dissimilar enough from one brought in contract to warrant a dif-
ferent statute of limitations. State legislatures should determine an appropriate
statutory period for both tort and contract actions. In the absence of such legisla-
tive action, the courts should apply the statute which gives the plaintiff the most
time in which to bring the suit. A contrary rule allows an attorney to profit from
his client's unfortunate decision to bring the suit in the "wrong" form. In addi-
tion, the discovery rule should govern the date of accrual for both forms of a legal
malpractice action. To hold otherwise permits the attorney to take advantage of
his superior knowledge regarding the legal services he renders. Similarly, just as
a contract action of legal malpractice survives the death of a party, so too does a
tort action deserve like treatment. Finally, courts should allow aggregation of
tort and contract damages in legal malpractice actions, provided duplicative
recovery does not result.
Commenting on the impact traditional rules of tort and contract still have
on judicial decisions, one judge noted that, "when the ghosts of the past stand in
the path of justice, clanking their medieval chains, the proper course for the
judge is to pass through them, undeterred." 203 So too in legal malpractice
actions, courts should step through the remnants of case and assumpsit to focus
on the merits of the plaintiff's claim, rather than on artificial distinctions
between tort and contract.
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Some courts have already allowed aggregation of tort and contract damages in other
areas of the law. See, e.g. , E. H. Boerth Co. v. Lad Properties, 82 F. R .D. 635, 646 (D. Minn, 1979)
("Recovery in tort does not preclude further recovery for breach of contract, provided the plaintiff
does not recover damages in excess of the actual injury sustained."); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54
Hawaii 18, 22, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (1972) ("ICjertain situations are so disposed as to present a
fusion of the doctrines of tort and contract.") GLENDON, supra note 10, at 9-10.
2D5 Lord Atkin, in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank, A.C. 1, 29 (1941), quoted in
Note, Tort and Contract, 93 LAW Q. REV. 422 (1977).
